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Abstract: In post-independence Zimbabwe, religion has been associated with piety and 
acquiescence rather than radical confrontation. This has made it look preposterous for religious 
leaders to adopt seemingly radical and confrontational stances in pursuit of peace and 
reconciliation. Since the early 2000s, a new breed of religious leaders that deploy radical and 
confrontational strategies to pursue peace has emerged in Zimbabwe. Rather than restricting 
pathways to peace and reconciliation to nonconfrontational approaches such as empathy, pacifism, 
prayer, meditation, love, repentance, compassion, apology and forgiveness, these religious leaders 
have extended them to demonstrations, petitions and critically speaking out. Because these religious 
leaders do not restrict themselves to the methods and strategies of engagement and dialogue 
advocated by mainstream church leaders, mainstream church leaders and politicians condemn 
them as nonconformists that transcend their religious mandate. These religious leaders have 
redefined and reframed the meaning and method of pursuing peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe 
and brought a new consciousness on the role of religious leaders in times of political violence and 
hostility. Through qualitative interviews with religious leaders from a network called Churches in 
Manicaland in Zimbabwe, which emerged at the height of political violence in the early 2000s, and 
locating the discussion within the discourse of peace and reconciliation, this article argues that the 
pursuit of peace and reconciliation by religious actors is not a predefined and linear, but rather a 
paradoxical and hermeneutical exercise which might involve seemingly contradictory approaches 
such as “hard” and “soft” strategies. Resultantly, religio-political nonconformism should not be 
perceived as a stubborn departure from creeds and conventions, but rather as a phenomenon that 
espouses potential to positively change socio-economic and political dynamics that advance peace 
and reconciliation.  
Keywords: peace and reconciliation; religio-political nonconformism; Zimbabwe; mainstream 
churches; piety; politics 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, a new breed of religious leaders that deploy relatively radical and 
confrontational strategies to advance peace and reconciliation has emerged. Rather than restricting 
pathways to peace to nonconfrontational approaches such as empathy, pacifism, prayer, meditation, 
love, repentance and compassion, these religious leaders have extended them to include 
demonstrations, petitions and critically speaking out. In doing so, they have redefined and reframed 
the meaning and method of pursuing peace in Zimbabwe and brought a new consciousness of the 
role of religious leaders in times of political hostility, especially that being radical and confrontational 
is not merely a stubborn parting from conventions but an approach that can bring new ideas and 
directions in the search for peace and reconciliation. This article argues that religious organizations 
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operating outside the jurisdiction of the mainstream churches have challenged the view that there is 
a contradiction between hard, radical and confrontational approaches, and soft, piety and 
acquiescence approaches in pursuit of peace and reconciliation by religious leaders. In what follows, 
I give a brief overview of the socio-economic and political context out of which the religio-political 
nonconformist organization under study emerged. I proceed to discuss the approach of the 
mainstream church leaders, pointing out what the religio-political organization pointed out as the 
weaknesses of the mainstream religious leaders which paved the way for their emergence. 
Subsequently, I unpack and discuss the culture, organization and operations of the religio-political 
organization concerning peace and reconciliation.  
2. Whither the Socio-Economic and Political Situation in Zimbabwe 
Churches in Manicaland emerged in the early 2000s due to the socio-economic and political 
instability and violence that befell Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was born on 17 April, 1980 after a 
protracted war of liberation. However, despite the reconciliation speech by the late former President 
(Prime Minister at the time) Robert Mugabe at independence, in which he urged former warring 
parties, blacks and whites to bury the past and focus on peace, reconciliation and the stability of the 
country, it never experienced true reconciliation. Instead, Zimbabwe has accumulated an array of 
conflict points which make the quest for peace and reconciliation imperative (Huyse 2003, p. 34). The 
conflicts were due to the contest for political and economic power between political parties, which 
created negative beliefs, attitudes and emotions, encouraging ordinary people to rise against each 
other on political grounds, thereby destroying the tapestry of relationships that formerly existed 
(Tarusarira 2016). 
The decade beginning in the year 2000 came to be known in policy circles and scholarship as the 
crisis decade. It was characterised by degeneration of the country into violence, a sacrifice of the rule 
of law, a militarisation of the state and a collapsing economy. Resultantly, opposition politics 
increased in response to the political crisis, which was attributed to bad governance. Citizens blamed 
the constitution of the country for failing to stop the rot that was in government. The constitutional 
discourse thus set the oppositional political mood of the decade. After consensus in the country that 
there was a need to write a new constitution to reform governance, a civic organization called the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) emerged to advocate the development of a people-driven 
constitution. The government feared that the move to change the constitution and the emergence of 
the NCA was going to paint it in a bad light since the elites in government were allegedly benefitting 
from the shortcomings of the existing constitution. To counteract the initiatives of the NCA, the 
government instituted its Constitutional Commission (CC), which produced a draft constitution that 
was rejected by the people in a referendum in the year 2000. This seemed to confirm the government’s 
fears and was the first overt sign of people’s disgruntlement with the Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) regime and an unprecedented defeat of the ruling party since 
independence in 1980. Action was needed quickly to mobilise and coordinate support by whatever 
means as there were impending elections. Some ZANU PF war veterans invaded commercial farms 
under the guise of a land reform programme. The land was the only remaining rhetorical source of 
mobilisation for ZANU PF (Dorman 2003, p. 848). Unruly gangs occupied the land, destroyed crops, 
confiscated livestock and equipment, and forced farm owners and their workers to flee during the 
preludes to the elections of 2000, 2002 and 2005 (Sachikonye, 2011; Tarusarira, 2016). The banning of 
the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) from campaigning 
characterized the election periods. Electoral violence and state-sponsored militias which harassed, 
intimidated and murdered MDC candidates and supporters became the signature of elections 
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2011, pp. 23–24).  
The regime introduced draconian laws. Cases in point include the Broadcasting Services Act, 
which was promulgated in 2001 to control electronic and print media. It claimed that its mission was 
to “provide world-class quality programmes and services that reflect, develop, foster and respect the 
Zimbabwean national identity, character, cultural diversity, national aspirations and Zimbabwean 
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and pan-African values” (Chiumbu, 2004, p. 30).1 Because the state feared insurrection, it introduced 
the Public Order and Security Act on the 22 January, 2002 to empower the state to “regulate” public 
gatherings, making it difficult for opposition movements to organise. Yet another law, the Access to 
Information and Privacy and Protection Act, was promulgated in 2002, allegedly “to make public 
bodies more accountable to the public and to protect personal privacy”. In practice, it served to silence 
critical media and increase the influence of the Minister of Information (Chuma, 2004, p. 134). 
Journalists and media houses were required to register, and foreign media were banned. Public 
media metamorphosed into a full-blown propaganda instrument, limiting public discourse to themes 
approved by the ZANU PF elites and “inventing traditions” (Tarusarira, 2016). “Invention of 
traditions” refers to “a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of 
a ritual or symbolic nature which set out to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1, 1994, p. 76). 
The Mugabe regime resorted to advancing political ideologies through patriotic history, 
manipulating history and nationalism in its favour. The regime’s patriotic history’s nationalist 
narratives exclude the voices of some political leaders from the history of the liberation war (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2008).  
The military—the heads of the army, police, air force, intelligence and prison charged with the 
mandate to protect national security—became an unofficial decision-making board reporting directly 
to Mugabe, thus able to act independently of cabinet decisions. Consequently, militaristic approaches 
became the default mode of governing the country. A case in point is Operation Murambatsvina, 
codenamed Operation Restore Order, which the regime implemented under the guise of cleansing 
cities of illegal business dealers and settlements in 2005. It left 700,000 urban Zimbabweans homeless 
(Tibaijuka, 2005, p. 7). Sometimes people were forced to demolish their dwellings or source of income 
in winter. A major motive was allegedly political retribution against sectors of the urban population 
who had voted MDC as well as the desire to ward off possible urban uprisings (Sachikonye, 2011, p. 
27). Operation Maguta (having enough to eat) transferred the management of food production from 
the ordinary civil service to the army, partly to ensure that the troops themselves remained well-fed 
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2011, pp. 26–27). The government launched Operation Mavhoterapapi (for 
whom did you vote?) after the presidential run-off in 2008, sacrificing democracy, the rule of law and 
the independency of the judiciary. It denied rights to information, freedom of association and 
minority rights. State officials ceased to be accountable, and elections lost credibility. Communities 
destroyed the tapestry of relationships that existed.  
3. Whither Mainstream Churches: Negative and Passive Peace-Making 
Against the deteriorating socio-economic and political environment, the historic mainstream 
churches and their apex bodies, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), the Zimbabwe 
Catholic Churches (ZCC) and the Evangelical Fellowship Zimbabwe (EFZ), attempted several times 
to facilitate behind-the-scenes talks between the main political parties, ZANU PF and the MDC. In 
the language of social movements, the mainstream refers to a set of authoritative institutions that can 
and do maintain public order, dominate economic activity and justify exercising power and 
authority. Cases in point include upper layers of governments, corporations and religious institutions 
(Lofland, 1996). The backchannel efforts by the mainstream church leadership are necessary to initiate 
political peace-making processes upon which social peace-making builds. While political processes 
may stop direct violence, that is, the physical violence that can be observed with the naked eye, such 
as bombs exploding or people being physically attacked with machetes, they do not address societal 
transformation. The mainstream churches were also rocked by divisions and ambivalent positions 
regarding their response to the crises. “Because of the lack of strong ecumenical cooperation, the ZCC, 
ZCBC and EFZ and other church bodies have not been influential in the formulation of government 
policy” (Makwasha, 2011, p. 236).  
                                                 
1 At the time of writing these laws are set to be replaced by new ones, under the guise of political reforms. 
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This is not to sidestep some of the initiatives mainstream churches have undertaken in civic 
matters in the country. They participated in the constitutional process of 1999 and have issued fearless 
pastoral statements, which irked the ZANU PF government (Chitando and Manyonganise, 2011, pp. 
83–86; Ruzivo, 2008). Such pastoral letters include “God Hears the Cry of the Oppressed”, in which 
the Catholic bishops were “blunt and to the point” (Chitando and Manyonganise, 2011, p. 84) 
regarding the crisis of leadership in the country. The pastoral letter provoked a ferocious response 
from President Mugabe. The ZCC issued a statement following the formation of the inclusive 
government in 2008, bemoaning the manipulation of democratic space and selective application of 
the law. The grouping Heads of Christian Denominations issued a statement in 2005 asking for 
people’s freedoms to be observed (Chitando and Manyonganise, 2011, p. 85). The point is that these 
bodies are not grassroots-based. They are far removed from the people. Their offices are located in 
big cities and inaccessible to ordinary people (Dube, 2006, p. 46). Besides, the extent to which the 
pastoral letters trickle through to the common people in the workplace, families and even the local 
Christian communities is very limited (Chitando 2005, p. 143). By preferring backchannel 
negotiations, and issuing ritualistic pastoral letters, mainstream churches distance themselves from 
the people. They only realize negative peace, understood as the absence of direct violence rather than 
an affirmation or achievement of fairness, justice and social redistribution, the latter of which 
represents positive peace (Galtung, 1996, p. 3). Peace incorporates feelings of well-being and a sense 
of flourishing (Wolterstorff, 1983). 
4. Enter Religio-Political Nonconformist Organizations 
Religious nonconformists refer to those religious organizations that operate outside of the 
mainstream religious landscape, such as sub-groups of mainstream denominations, independent 
Christian congregations, minority denominations and religious socio-political organizations (Ganiel 
and Tarusarira, 2012). The mainstream political establishment defines the reality claims of 
nonconformists as improper, implausible, immoral, false, threatening, corrupting, seditious, 
treasonous, blasphemous, despicable, or in some other way not respectable or deserving serious 
consideration (Lofland, 1996, see Ganiel and Tarusarira, 2012). Resultantly, nonconformists develop 
“a systematic counterculture, a modus operandi associated with those estranged from the centres of 
power and communication” (Comaroff, 1985). The moment they develop a counterculture, they 
adopt a modus operandi that is “hard” rather than “soft”. Hard approaches become necessary 
because politicians in Zimbabwe seem to have gotten used to the routine that at some point the 
mainstream church leaders will issue out pastoral statements condemning violence (soft approach), 
to which they (politicians) pay deaf ears (see Togarasei and Chitando, 2011). They seem not to be 
moved by the pastoral letters. When this has happened, mainstream church leaders have not taken 
any further radical actions such as demonstrations. Religio-political groups like Churches in 
Manicaland (CiM) in Zimbabwe seem to expect radical and confrontational approaches from the 
mainstream churches, the absence of which has irked them.  
This paper takes a case study approach to study CiM, which defines itself as an ecumenical 
gathering of church leaders representing Christian denominations and organizations in the province 
of Manicaland. At its inception, it had 40 churches and church-related organizations affiliated to it. 
These included the Catholics, Anglicans and Lutheran churches, the Apostolic Church of Pentecost, 
the Elim Pentecostal Church, the Pentecostal Assemblies of God, the United Apostolic Faith Church 
and the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God (ZAOGA), to name a few. It aimed to bring together as many 
Christian organizations as is possible (Manyonganise, 2015). CiM is based in Manicaland Province. 
While other platforms such as Churches in Bulawayo and Churches in Masvingo have adopted its 
outlook, they are not its branches. Bulawayo and Masvingo are also provinces, like Manicaland. They, 
however, share notes on how to participate in civic matters as religious actors. Middle-aged religious 
males dominate the platform. Woman and youths are underrepresented. Manicaland is one of eight 
provinces in Zimbabwe. Situated in the east of the country on the borders with Mozambique, it has 
a population of approximately one and half million people. More than half of this number are 
Christians linked to different churches. Mutare is the capital of Manicaland and has a population of 
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approximately 250,000. As of 2018, Zimbabwe has an estimated population of 14 million people. Of 
these, “86 percent claim to be Christian, 11 percent reports no religious affiliation, less than 2 percent 
adheres uniquely to traditional beliefs, and less than 1 percent is Muslim”. Of the total population, 37 
percent is Apostolic, 21 percent Pentecostal, 16 percent other Protestant, 7 percent Roman Catholic and 5 
percent other Christian. Many Christians also associate themselves with traditional practices, thus 
syncretism is rife. There are also small numbers of Greek Orthodox, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and Baha’is 
(U.S. Department of State, 2018). 
5. Methodology 
To study this organization, I adopted a case study method to profile the beliefs and practices of 
CiM. I conducted eight semistructured interviews with its members, guided by questions and themes 
that revolved around its ideology/culture and organisation as well as how it negotiates the 
environment to challenge the mainstream ethic. The length of the interviews ranged from forty-five 
minutes to one hour. To recruit my interviewees, I relied on snowball sampling. Interview partners 
referred me to their fellow members. This was the best method of recruitment considering that the 
security of the interviewees was of concern since they were challenging political elites as well. To 
guard against undue homogeneity, I used other methods such as a review of grey literature. I also 
interviewed other people who were not members of CiM. At the beginning of the interviews, I 
explained to the interview partners that I was the only one who would access the interview 
recordings and transcripts, and I was going to keep them safe. The transcripts were strictly for 
academic purposes and nothing more. The interviewees were free to withdraw from the interview 
without any consequences, had the right to refuse to answer any questions, and their responses 
would remain anonymous. I proposed to use pseudonyms since the topic of research was politically 
sensitive. I also deployed the snowball sampling from different angles to be able to be directed from 
different ways and have a heterogeneous sample of respondents within the organization.  
While this article relies heavily on the interviews, my analysis was influenced by other research 
methods as well. I had email communication with some of its key members, who provided me with 
background information. I consulted grey literature, which included press statements, publications 
and booklets. Grey literature helped me to trace the genealogy of CiM, gather information about its 
official positions, reconstruct its development and acted as a canvass against which to understand 
the general discourse within which it operates. I also gathered data from online social media such as 
Facebook, which provided unexpected data. To analyse the data, I systematically coded it according 
to preset and emergent major themes or codes.  
The analysis of the data showed minimal disagreement regarding the ideology and practice of 
CiM. This can be accounted for by the fact that members studied CiM before committing to it. 
Absence from participating in some activities demonstrated some of the disagreements. CiM had 
room for this. A case in point is when some members of the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God in Africa 
(ZAOGA) who did not subscribe to the radical and confrontational approaches of CiM, such as 
demonstrations and distributing pamphlets with civic materials at bus termini, chose to take a lead 
in activities that centred around humanitarian aid, prayer and worship. One of the three prominent 
Bishops who were part of CiM jumped ship at some point and joined those who supported the ruling 
regime.  
The Discourse and Practice of CiM in Pursuing Peace and Reconciliation 
The mission of CiM was to challenge both the mainstream churches’ culture of silence and the 
violence that had engulfed the Zimbabwean political field. CiM is an “ecumenical” gathering of 
members from Christian denominations and organisations in the eastern province of Zimbabwe 
called Manicaland. It was formed in 2000, at a time of great uncertainty, intimidation and violence 
ahead of the elections. It claims that it aims to “seek the guidance of the Holy Spirit in taking action 
to promote tolerance in society, to give direction to public decision-makers and to enable our people 
to live Gospel values and principles” (Churches in Manicaland, 2006). The use of the word “churches” 
does not refer to the institutional churches but to individual Christians, who would otherwise not be 
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able to speak at high-ranking platforms such as those of mainstream bodies (Mkaronda, 2003, p. 30). 
We see that the organization does not want to divorce itself from the traditional and recognized 
churches entirely, hence strategically retains the word “church” in its name. CiM describes itself as 
“strictly non-partisan regarding party politics and ... available to all for counselling, pastoral care and 
the building of a Christian vision for ... society” (Churches in Manicaland, 2006). An official said:  
CiM is a platform of church leaders, laity and clergy who come together to see how best 
they can intervene in situations that need intervention, especially when we look at the 
political terrain in Zimbabwe. It started in 2000 during the height of political violence. 
Manicaland was also very much affected, so the church leaders thought it wise to come 
together and try to intervene .... We focus on human rights. Hence even where there is an 
unfair distribution of resources, we try to see how we can intervene and talk to the powers 
that be. 
The formation of CiM centred on direct intervention in response to the cries of the victims of 
political violence. A founding member of CiM described to me how the original group of 14 religious 
leaders came together, assisted by the World Council of Churches, to begin the process of reflecting 
on the Zimbabwean crisis. Because these clergy felt they needed high-profile people to gain some 
legitimacy, they approached Bishop B of the Anglican Church and Bishop C of the Roman Catholic 
Church to be part of the organisation. The founding member noted that starting to talk about political 
violence was not easy after a long time of avoiding the topic within religious circles. Eventually, there 
was consensus that there was a crisis and the churches in Manicaland had to intervene, she asserted. 
They called together as many churches as they could, regardless of denomination. Their next meeting 
had about eighty people. They started these meetings against the background of rumours that the 
Chinese, who have warm political relations with the Zimbabwean ruling regime and carry out many 
government technical and infrastructural projects, had mounted big satellites with which they could, 
on behalf of the ruling party, see everyone’s vote.  
Regarding their motivation to become members of CiM, some asserted that they felt that they 
had a biblical mandate to participate in issues that affect their lives. Others joined through the 
encouragement of already participating members. Some said that the desire to pursue peace and 
justice issues was inborn. As one respondent told me, “I would see myself since childhood trying to 
advocate for other people, when I feel that injustice was being done, hence when I heard about CiM 
and was invited to a meeting, I just clicked in.”  
To justify its radical and confrontational approach to peace, CiM members say they feel 
compelled to react to socio-economic situations, and in that process, they make their faith relevant. 
Unlike what might be called secular civil society organisations, CiM draws upon both the Old and 
New Testament texts and figures. Bishop B of CiM had the following to say:  
You look back to the time of Micah, Hosiah, and Amos. State religion was there; the 
Pharisees were there; they had lost the vision, so God had to keep on sending his prophets 
to tell the Pharisees that what they were doing was wrong. The prophets are not 
condemning ordinary people; they are condemning the King and his cronies, so it is that 
kind of prophetic ministry that will make some people look redundant.  
CiM members also deploy scriptural texts to argue that they do not separate the religious, the 
social, the economic and the political. For them, the spiritual is entangled with the socio-economic 
and political, so they need to deal with life holistically. In the same way that the Old Testament 
prophets condemned not only religious prostitution but also social and political institutions, so do 
they. They mention prophets like Amos, who was concerned with trade, for instance, manipulating 
trade scales, that is, economic issues. Prophets were concerned with political issues, notably about 
how kings were using or abusing their power, so they argue. Politicians have admonished them for 
their stance, who have argued that as religious leaders, they should leave politics to politicians.  
“No, we can’t. There is no way you can separate the two. The problem comes when the church 
becomes partisan and supports a particular party”, remarked a respondent. The relationship of 
religio-political nonconformist organizations like CiM with the political system contrasts with that of 
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the mainstream churches, the latter of whom are silent, silenced, co-opted or sometimes express 
outright pronouncements of legitimation in the face of political violence. The mainstream churches 
seem compromised by bureaucracy, conservatism and proximity to political power. The emergence 
of organisations such as CiM confirms that in the face of a crisis, dissenting leaders from within may 
emerge and forge alliances with outsiders. It also shows that “in whatever sort of political system, 
widespread and profound disaster reopens the question of legitimate authority and the effective 
leadership in the conduct of the church leadership” (Fields, 1982, p. 353). 
CiM, as I pointed out above, describes itself as strictly nonpartisan regarding party politics 
(Churches in Manicaland, 2006). My observation was also that it had easy access to non-ZANU PF 
(ruling party) politicians, thereby casting doubt on its nonpartisanship claim and weakening its 
criticism that mainline churches court ZANU PF politicians. A case in point is when Bishop B spoke 
at an opposition MDC campaign rally in 2013. He was reported in a Facebook post of the MDC to 
have  
urged all Zimbabweans from all walks of life to rally in commitment behind President’ 
Tsvangirai (the late leader of the opposition). He also noted that we need humble people 
with love to lead us into a new Zimbabwe, saying that an open palm (the symbol of the 
MDC) is used to rebuild compared to a closed fist (the symbol of the ruling party ZANU 
PF) which is used to destroy. He thanked God and called upon Him to usher our nation 
into a new Zimbabwe which we all need (MDC Facebook post 2015). 
Surprised by this position of a prominent figure of CiM, I asked one of the founding members about 
this, and he emailed:  
It does not sound like him. Is it possible that he did not say this but someone is deliberately 
misquoting him? If he did say it, I would not agree with his approach. If (Bishop B) did say 
what he is quoted as saying, he could be asked to give reasons as to why he adopted this 
approach. It seems to be out of character with the person that I knew.  
This might suggest that principles and action do not always agree, or that while in general there 
was much agreement amongst the members of CiM, there are cases when there were differences. 
Above we saw members of ZAOGA deciding to participate only in prayer activities, and here we 
encounter Bishop B participating at an event of an opposition party. My email correspondent shows 
disagreement with Bishop B’s approach. 
6. Comprehending Peace and Reconciliation 
Peace and reconciliation are central to the mission of CiM. What is significant and in line with 
the argument of this article is that not as expected of religious leaders in Zimbabwe, CiM takes radical, 
confrontational and grassroots-based approaches to pursue political objectives. It defines 
reconciliation as “dealing with pain and resentment, hurt and anger leading to healing” (Churches 
in Manicaland, 2006, p. 11). Some members of CiM feel that contrition or repentance is of paramount 
importance in the process. Bishop B describes reconciliation as a process of “re-membering” with the 
political other(s) after losing membership through committing atrocious acts:  
Genuine reconciliation includes contrition, being inwardly sorry, and if you do not 
demonstrate that contrition, there is no reconciliation. I can’t say, ‘Forget about it, it was 
child’s play.’ It is warding off the problem. Reconciliation means a person has to swallow 
his or her pride. It demands a lot of humility—giving oneself on the table and asking to be 
helped to be ‘one of us again’ because he or she is no longer one of us. That is when for me 
reconciliation begins. 
In his account of what reconciliation entails, Bishop B accentuates a demonstration of contrition. 
He emphasizes contrition and being sorry. For him, without an apology, there is no reconciliation. 
His emphasis on contrition and being inwardly sorry intersects with what I have elsewhere called 
transformative apology, understood as an apology that comes from deep within the wrongdoer’s 
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heart and mind, one that ruptures ideas, narratives and ideologies that made the wrongdoer see it 
justified in the first place to commit the wrong (Tarusarira, 2019). Bishop B is thus against 
instrumental apologies which guarantee neither the rupture of the epistemic bedrock of wrongdoing, 
nor that the same wrongdoing will not be repeated to another person. 
In Zimbabwe, there is a tendency to separate religious approaches to peace and reconciliation 
from political ones. It is upon this distinction that religious approaches to dealing with violence and 
its legacies are classified as “soft”, thus possessing soft power (Haynes, 2012) and characterised by 
piety, while political approaches are categorised as “hard” and not bent on piety. The distinction 
between soft and hard approaches resonates with the concept of religious soft power which was 
developed by Jeffrey Haynes in discussing how religion affects foreign policy (Haynes, 2008), as an 
extension of Joseph Nye’s (1990) concept of “soft power”. Soft power refers to the ability of ideas to 
make an influence or appeal to a targeted audience without using “hard power” that is often 
associated with state power. These ideas shape the values and norms of international and local 
institutions. The concept of soft power was introduced by Nye (1990) to show that hard power is not 
the only way to achieve political goals. Power is about influencing others towards desired goals. This 
can be done through the use of sticks, carrots or attraction. Soft power is thus defined as “the ability 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” Its power lies not 
necessarily in influence, but in attraction of the culture, ideas, policies or principles. It thus appeals 
and does not force. It is about persuasion and encouragement. It is contrasted with the notion of 
“hard power”, that is, military or economic influence, involving overt leverage and/or coercion (Nye, 
2005; Haynes, 2009). Religious soft power should include cultural (including religious) actors who 
seek to influence foreign policy by encouraging policymakers to incorporate religious beliefs, norms 
and values into foreign policy (Haynes, 2008). It is when religious organisations seek to influence 
using religious beliefs, norms and values (Haynes, 2009).  
While CiM is not opposed to religious soft power, which it also deploys since it is an organisation 
founded on certain ideals and values, it does not limit itself to it. Religious soft power is connected 
to piety, but as Bishop B has shown, that is not enough. Nye (2005) acknowledged that soft power 
works in situations where there are willing interpreters and receivers. We have seen already that this 
is not the case in Zimbabwe where politicians are not willing interpreters and receivers, but pay deaf 
ears to the soft power of mainstream churches. Furthermore, soft power tends to produce a diffuse 
effect, creating general influence rather than producing early observable specific action, which is 
required in times of violence, like the context under discussion in Zimbabwe. Related to this is that 
soft power is relevant for what are called “milieu goals”, like shaping an environment conducive to 
democracy, but less relevant to immediate goals like preventing an attack and violence, as we see in 
the Zimbabwean context in the 2000s. Confronted with these limitations of soft power, CiM 
appreciates what might be called “hard power”, which in this case is represented not by guns, bombs 
and heavy artillery, but by radical and confrontational demonstrations and petitions. 
CiM challenges these distinctions and bridges the religious and socio-political dimensions of 
reconciliation (see Porter 2003, p. 14). Unlike in the past when the resolution of the conflict was 
discussed mainly in political terms of democracy, justice, equality, freedom, rights, stability and the 
rule of law, today there is an increasing recognition of the importance of terms such as healing, 
repentance and forgiveness, which were once largely restricted to the religious domain. This 
intermingling marks the recognition of reconciliation as a political and cultural priority. In describing 
reconciliation, my CiM informant spoke of “contrition”, “inner sorry”, “humility”, “repentance” and 
“forgive me”. “Forgetting” was ruled out as an option having been associated with the Christian 
concept of forgiveness in Zimbabwe through the dictum “forget and forgive” at independence in 
1980, which I alluded to earlier. Bridging the religious and socio-political dimensions addresses the 
fear that reconciliation might be no more than a cheap religious, specifically Christian, process which 
seems to make a necessary connection between apology and forgiveness.  
CiM members emphasize that reconciliation is not only political but societal as well. Political 
reconciliation, which tends to be associated with the top religious, political and military leadership 
of society or what is called Track 1 diplomacy, does not necessarily translate to the restoration of 
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broken relationships in communities. Yet, communities provide the cement for sustainable 
reconciliation in society. Thus, CiM members advocated a platform that would facilitate a nationwide 
process of national healing. They believe that there must be a system that gives perpetrators of 
violence no option to avoid telling what happened. They argue that, in the context of Zimbabwe, a 
politically led process is not productive, because the powerful will protect themselves. Rev. D said: 
As long as there are people who have power and are unreachable, because they are so 
powerful, the process will not get anywhere. What we would like to see happening is the 
formation of an ‘independent’ body to spearhead this process, which would consult or 
bring onboard political players. Those who have been perpetrating violence for years seem 
to be influencing from behind. I would have loved to see independent people like heads of 
churches and perhaps lawyers for human rights. 
Mrs A echoed his sentiments: “what is needed is not a composition of appointed personalities”, 
but “a process that takes on transparency and people feeding in and saying what they want”. It was 
clear that the call for an independent body and the suggestion for church leaders to lead the process 
was influenced by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation (TRC), which was dominated by religious 
leaders, prominent among them being Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Rev. Alex Boraine, the Chair 
and Deputy respectively. It must be noted, however, that the dominance of religious leaders in South 
Africa’s TRC was not without concerns from representatives of other religious traditions who felt 
that they were not represented. CiM respondents did not suggest traditional leaders, presumably 
because the traditional leaders had lost moral credibility because they were co-opted by the ruling 
regime. Notable here is that CiM members do not mince their words and are not “soft” with the 
process of peace and reconciliation, as demonstrated by its members’ “hard” stance regarding the 
politicians whom they argue should not be allowed to get away without telling the truth of what they 
did during the periods of violence. Instead of only dialoguing and continuously engaging them, as 
would be advocated by the mainstream churches, CiM’s nonconformist character mandates it to take 
robust approaches that compel politicians to be accountable for what they might have done.  
Truth-telling was pointed out as a precondition for forgiveness. While truth-telling is generally 
agreed to be an indispensable element of the reconciliation process, it is not straightforward; it is 
delicate, sensitive and complicated. The caution would be that it needs not to be taken as a way of 
escaping justice, especially in cases where truth is exchanged for freedom, as was the case in the South 
African TRC, where truth-telling was traded for amnesty. No wonder Prof. A said, “Is it possible to 
just ask people to forgive each other? It will not work because the truth is not out. Truth and justice 
create healing and reconciliation... subjecting that truth to justice, then you get healing and you get 
reconciliation.” This truth must be gathered from the grassroots people around the country, the 
majority of whom are victims of the contest between the political elites. Rev. Dr A affirmed the need 
to hear the stories of ordinary people, saying “We need people vakadimurwa maoko (who had their 
hands cut off) to tell their stories and what they want, we need people from Matabeleland massacres 
in the early 1980s to tell their stories.” Truth-telling, healing, reconciliation and forgiveness were 
linked by Bishop A:  
There is no way that there is going to be peacebuilding and national healing without truth-
telling because only when one tells the truth even before anything happens that brings 
about some sort of mutual healing. After the truth, we then look at healing and after justice 
people can then talk about forgiveness and reconciliation is likely to follow. 
Mr A confirmed this position: “It is important for the perpetrators of violence, who were 
involved in destroying property and people’s lives, to own up to their actions and acknowledge they 
were wrong and that they are seeking to turn over a new leaf.” Repentance and reparations are 
possible in cases where stolen goods can be returned or compensation made for destroyed property. 
Mr B said that the perpetrator should be able to say “I am sorry, what should I do?” The truth 
involved here comes from the victims and the perpetrators of the abuses. Tutu (1999) calls this social 
truth, that is, truth gathered from social interaction, discussion and debate. CiM, therefore, calls for a 
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comprehensive and rigorous process of reconciliation rather than a mere cheap and pious process 
that covers up for perpetrators. 
7. Repentance, Apology and Forgiveness  
In the discourse of reconciliation, influenced by Christian ethics, repentance is connected to an 
apology. When the offender demonstrates sorrow and assumes responsibility, the victim may feel 
drawn, if not pressured, to offer forgiveness. In South Africa’s TRC, clergymen such as Desmond 
Tutu were criticised for pushing for forgiveness from the victims (Tutu, 1999). There is a concern that 
forgiveness was emphasised much more than justice and accountability (Shore, 2012). CiM members 
linked justice, truth-telling and forgiveness. Rev. D said:  
We want justice. We want people to be able to confess, tell us the story, how they got 
involved, why they got involved and that they are sorry to have been involved, and then 
those who have been hurt and those who have been inflicted and suffered and have lost 
will then say okay, we realise this happened yesterday, so we accept that you are asking for 
forgiveness.  
Perpetrators need to acknowledge their wrongdoing, argued Fr B, and it is expected that the 
victim will accept the apologies offered by the perpetrators (see also Waziweyi, 2011, p. 96). This 
expectation, however, as we will see below, puts pressure on the victim to forgive without taking 
into consideration how much the victim feels hurt and how much time he or she needs to heal 
(Tarusarira, 2019). This expectation to forgive should not be another way of saying that the victims 
ought to forgive, it just means that more often than not victims forgive when an apology has been 
offered. Apologies well-received by the wronged person can influence a shift in attitude and may 
inspire forgiveness (Tarusarira, 2019). 
Fr B, thus, perceives truth-telling and justice as preconditions for forgiveness because victims 
want to know for what they are forgiving a person and for that the perpetrator of violence has to 
describe the wrong they did (see Tutu, 1999). Were the victim to forgive without knowledge of the 
truth, they would remain haunted by unanswered questions, and this can stifle healing. They could 
remain in what Philpott calls “wounds of ignorance”, where the surviving victims suffer from 
ignorance about what happened to their family and friends violated during the violence and how 
that happened, for instance who pulled the trigger that killed one’s relative (Philpott, 2006). Only 
truth-telling by the wrongdoer can adequately address this form of woundedness. The 
characterization of reconciliation by the respondents features “soft” words such as repentance, 
contrition, healing and forgiveness. However, they do not hesitate to invoke “hard” terms such as 
accountability, justice and confrontation when need be, thus challenging that religion is always about 
piety.  
What is instructive from the respondents’ position regarding forgiveness is that it goes beyond 
its therapeutic dimension or its implementation as a practice of faith. Forgiveness is generally 
understood as the “willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment and 
indifferent behaviour toward one who unjustly hurt us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of 
compassion, generosity, and even love towards him or her” (Enright et al., 1998). By connecting 
forgiveness to justice, Fr B concedes to the abandonment of one’s right to resentment, but also leaves 
room for the victims to exercise that right as well. Mainstream churches would not see the two 
coexisting. CiM perceives reconciliation as both individual and societal, with the individual 
embedded in the social dimension (Tarusarira, 2019). This is telling considering that often victims are 
advised to let go and forgive even without having received justice or knowing the truth. To forgive 
and let go is presented as standing on high moral ground. Some have argued that forgiveness is 
meant to free the victim from being held hostage by anger and resentment (see Lennon, 2009). Thus, 
to forgive should not be dependent on anything. Howard Zehr (2005, p. 47) has argued:  
Forgiveness is letting go of the power the offence and the offender have over a person. It 
means no longer letting that offence and offender dominate. Without this experience of 
forgiveness, without this closure, the wound festers, the violation takes over our 
Religions 2020, 11, 235 11 of 15 
 
consciousness, our lives. It, and the offender, are in control. Real forgiveness, then, is an act 
of empowerment and healing. It allows one to move from victim to survivor. 
The respondents challenged the understanding that the victim will transcend their victimhood 
and psychic preoccupation with a perpetrator. It is a slippery slope on which the focus might shift 
from the victim to the perpetrator. In the final analysis, forgiveness will serve the perpetrator, who 
will appear to be wounded and begging to be readmitted into the realm of moral humanity. The 
burden of rehumanizing the perpetrator falls on the shoulder of the victim (see Saunders, 2011). 
8. Justice and Reparations  
The balance between retributive and restorative justice often puts CiM members in a bind. 
Retributive justice tends to be associated with the liberal secular critique, rather than with religion 
whose members are expected not to focus on punishment or retribution. Fr B expressed the dilemma 
that sometimes ensues amongst the members regarding restorative and retributive justice:  
Restorative justice is good, in that we are trying to restore what has been destroyed. But 
again, some things cannot be restored. If a family loses a member, there is no way we can 
restore that though again punitive justice can act as a deterrent, because in Zimbabwe the 
culture of impunity has gone on for too long. And it’s now very difficult to deal with that, 
so some form of punitive justice, especially for serious crimes like murder, rape, I would 
say let’s go for punitive justice. 
Fr B concurred that some form of restorative justice concerning people who lost property and 
their livelihood due to political violence must be done. Demands for compensation are 
understandable where people are struggling to eke out a living. While CiM emphasises restorative 
justice, retributive justice is not ruled out as a deterrent measure against a culture of impunity 
(Waziweyi, 2011, p. 66). It is here that it accentuates retributive justice in a way that mainstream 
churches do not do. 
Regarding retributive justice through reparations, Bishop B referred to the Old Testament: “In 
the OT reconciliation meant that if you stole my cow, for genuine reconciliation to occur, you have to 
pay four, not one.” Asking for compensation for what one has taken or making up for a crime 
committed is biblical. Fr A had great respect for the African tradition, in this case, specifically the 
Shona religion. He remarked, “I am arguing that even traditional leaders can play a part. If I took 
your chicken, I can go to the traditional leader and say, I took his chicken and I want to give it back. 
We can resolve that at that level.” This resonates with Waziweyi’s assertion that among the Shona, 
the wronged used to spell out what he or she wanted (kubata makuku) as payment if they were 
brothers or relatives, and kuripa as compensation if not related (Waziweyi, 2011, p. 65). In this way, 
judiciary costs are lowered. Restitution is, however, easier to deal with when only one side is wrong, 
but not when both or all sides in the conflict have lost property. Who will compensate whom, and 
what about those permanently injured, let alone those who died, becomes the question.  
What we see here is that while CiM comprises Christian members, they do not underestimate 
the role of African philosophy and culture. Kubata makuku and kuripa, outlined above and along with 
others, are summarized in the African philosophy concept of ubuntu/unhu—a person is a person with 
or through other people (see Mbiti, 1969, pp. 108–109; Tutu, 1999, p. 34–36). Ubuntu facilitates seeing 
oneself in another person. This approach thus changes the perspective of dealing with the conflict. 
While not opposed by the mainstream churches, most of the time the mainstream churches promote 
Christian values of dealing with the conflict and tend to be silent on African philosophical and 
cultural values. CiM foregrounds African philosophy and culture’s connection to both retributive 
and restorative justice and truth-telling. 
9. CiM’s Approaches to Peace and Reconciliation 
CiM organises several activities to create spaces for peace and reconciliation. These activities 
include workshops with pastors, in whom they have an interest because they have access to many 
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people through their churches. They also engage the chiefs, who are expected to embody the societal 
values of peace and reconciliation. The majority of CiM members happen to be pastors and church 
people who share some values, even though they may differ on strategies of putting them into 
practice. It has also been the mission of CiM to change the perspective of other pastors that politics 
belongs only to politicians involved in partisan politics. To this end, CiM organises public meetings 
around the prayer worship idea, where different churches are invited for an ecumenical prayer event. 
At the height of the violence, CiM created rapid response teams to back up local churches by 
reacting to reports of incidents of violence. It also created race relations (considering the tensions that 
had developed between the war veterans and white commercial farmers), youth and research teams. 
It engaged in direct services such as providing comfort, food and shelter to victims of the crisis 
(Mkaronda, 2003, p. 39). In cases of injustice, they deployed the justice and peace commissions to 
facilitate litigation. For the brutalised and violated, it provided medication and counselling. To 
advocate a change of policies, it engaged politicians and other authorities in dialogue meetings. For 
instance, it contacted the Governor of Manicaland province and asked her to make a statement 
against violence, invited the chief of police and the Electoral Commission to issue public statements 
on security and electoral processes, respectively. It also delivered its publications and statements to 
the Governor of Manicaland, political and administrative heads and Members of Parliament, and 
sent delegations to discuss issues with national political leaders who came from Manicaland 
Province. It talked to MPs after elections to outline the expectations of communities.  
As an organization, CiM issues several pastoral letters and press statements such as the 
compendium The Truth Will Make You Free (2006), which addresses various issues in the political 
sphere. Rev D shared that they deconstruct their pastoral letters and statements and take them down 
to the grassroots level, discussing them with the people (see Churches in Manicaland, 2006, p. ii). 
Cases in point include the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets with civic information during 
elections, at public bus termini for travellers to take with them to the remotest places of the country. 
Such activities have not been witnessed amongst those undertaken by the mainstream churches. They 
would not be perceived as activities to be undertaken by religious leaders, but instead by political 
enthusiasts. But here we see a different modus operandi that links secular and religious approaches, 
creating a resourceful archive that caters for Zimbabwe’s population, which for the most part does 
not distinguish between the religious and the secular. Analysing the interviewees’ responses and 
perusing their grey literature shows that CiM’s theoretical and practical tools close the gap between 
being a merciful, peaceful and forgiving religious person, and demanding that perpetrators of 
atrocities face justice, the truth of past atrocities be told, reparations be made and apologies be 
expressed. Instead of just dealing with the individual suffering of victims, the respondents advocate 
systems and structures that address the perpetrators of atrocities and safeguard reconciliation. This 
is not to intimate that mainstream churches do not call for justice and truth. Mainstream churches’ 
para-organizations like the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), which were radical 
during the liberation struggle and the early years after independence, vigorously challenged political 
violence. But the situation has since changed. In a personal email communication, an attaché to the 
CCJP wrote to me: 
The Zimbabwe Catholics Bishops Conference (ZCBC) seems to be tightening its grip on 
CCJPZ activities. The process (of issuing press statements) is more bureaucratic. A press 
statement for print media has to be approved by at least three bishops before it is allowed 
in the public domain. Given the tight schedules of most of the bishops, some press 
statements are approved late when the information on them is no longer relevant.  
To be noted is that CCJP in the 1970s enjoyed relative autonomy from the Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference and its opinion did not have to be viewed as the official position of the bishops (Gundani, 
2001, p. 72). It spoke with an independent voice, sometimes at odds with that of the bishops 
(McLaughlin, 1996, p. 4), thus could afford to be nonconformist. This allowed the organisation to be 
quicker and more effective than it arguably is now. It possessed qualities of a religio-political 
nonconformist organisation, and the popularity it attained can be attributed to that. 
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10. Conclusions 
This article set out to argue that the pursuit for peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe has been 
taken to another level by religious leaders operating outside the jurisdiction of the mainstream 
churches in a move that I have called religio-political nonconformism. While upholding the 
importance of religious soft power (Haynes, 2008, 2009), its limitations, which resonate with those of 
soft power in general (Nye, 1990), have prompted religio-political organizations such as CiM in 
Zimbabwe to invoke hard power, in the form of radical and confrontational approaches. The 
tendency to accentuate the soft power of religion might obscure the potential and necessity of hard 
power from religio-political organisations. Instead of sticking to only to the soft approach in pursuing 
peace and reconciliation, which is associated with religious actors in Zimbabwe, the nonconformist 
groups have gone for radical and confrontational strategies. This has influenced the public’s 
understanding not only of how religion operates in the public sphere, but also shown that the 
dynamics of reconciliation such as apology, forgiveness, truth-telling and justice can be pursued in a 
nonconformist, radical and confrontational way when need be. Furthermore, their approaches have 
indicated that these dynamics of reconciliation are neither cast in stone nor waiting out there to be 
discovered. By calling for truth-telling and justice as prerequisites, they redefined and shielded 
reconciliation from abuse by those in power. The ruling party has a history of burying the truth. A 
case in point is when the government refused to make public the report that was produced by the 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace on the massacres that took place in the early 1980s in 
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe 
(1997), 2008). Truth-telling is taken beyond its therapeutic use by the victim to being a foundation for 
justice as well. The nonconformists redefine reconciliation as more than being sorry, forgiving and 
forgetting. They have as well redefined key elements of reconciliation such as apology and 
forgiveness so that they do not make reconciliation cheap, a charge levelled against Tutu’s (1999) 
forgiveness during the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In so doing, they have 
call for transformative apology and forgiveness. In general, nonconformists have problematized 
approaches to peace and reconciliation, and the article argues that the approaches are discursive and 
variegated, multiple and can appear to be inconsistent. They are contingent on and constructed 
according to circumstances. So are the pathways to pursue them, they are not fixed but context-
specific. The upholding of tradition and culture, which are different and dynamic, through Ubuntu 
philosophy demonstrates this point. To understand the dynamics of religio-political organisations, 
we should not only consider the beliefs and values which define them, but also their practical actions, 
because adherents to religions do not always follow the dictates of their religion. Restricting analyses 
to belies and creeds will obscure the lived religion dimension of religious agents. Ultimately this 
article has shown that hard approaches are not a stubborn departure from the established 
conventions, but have the potential to positively influence and change socio-political dynamics in the 
pursuit of sustainable peace and reconciliation. 
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